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ABSTRACT
Online reviews play a crucial role in helping consumers evaluate
and compare products and services. However, review hosting sites
are often targeted by opinion spamming. In recent years, many
such sites have put a great deal of effort in building effective re-
view filtering systems to detect fake reviews and to block mali-
cious accounts. Thus, fraudsters or spammers now turn to com-
promise, purchase or even raise reputable accounts to write fake
reviews. Based on the analysis of a real-life dataset from a review
hosting site (dianping.com), we discovered that reviewers’ posting
rates are bimodal and the transitions between different states can
be utilized to differentiate spammers from genuine reviewers. In-
spired by these findings, we propose a two-mode Labeled Hidden
Markov Model to detect spammers. Experimental results show that
our model significantly outperforms supervised learning using lin-
guistic and behavioral features in identifying spammers. Further-
more, we found that when a product has a burst of reviews, many
spammers are likely to be actively involved in writing reviews to
the product as well as to many other products. We then propose
a novel co-bursting network for detecting spammer groups. The
co-bursting network enables us to produce more accurate spam-
mer groups than the current state-of-the-art reviewer-product (co-
reviewing) network.
1. INTRODUCTION
Opinions in reviews are increasingly used by individuals and or-
ganizations for making purchase decisions. Positive opinions of-
ten mean profits and fames for businesses and individuals, which
unfortunately give strong incentives for fraudsters to promote or
to discredit some target products or services. Such activities are
called opinion spamming [13]. Unlike web spam, opinion spam
involves complex user dynamics. Several researchers have studied
this problem [7, 14, 15, 19, 20]. Many review hosting companies
such as Yelp and Dianping have also built their own filtering sys-
tems to identify and to remove (or hide) fake reviews from their
product pages. These systems help alleviate the negative influence
of fake reviews and greatly increase the cost of spamming. Fraud-
sters are thus forced to promote or demote products using accounts
with high credibility because reviews from such accounts are likely
to survive and to be trusted by consumers. Some of those accounts
are compromised or bribed by the fraudsters, but the cost is high.
Therefore, spammers began to raise their own accounts by behav-
ing like genuine reviewers for a period of time and then use these
“trustworthy” accounts to launch spam campaigns. Such accounts
are usually called raised accounts (like raising kids) which behave
normally simply to gain credibility in some period of time but are
later used to write fake reviews that may be ranked higher by review
systems to collectively launch spam campaigns.
Our work is motivated by this observation from the review host-
ing site dianping.com. Using their real-life filtered (fake or spam)
and unfiltered (genuine) reviews, we discovered that both spam-
mers and non-spammers exhibit bimodal temporal posting patterns
but their patterns differ greatly. Based on this bimodal discovery,
we propose to use two-mode Hidden Markov Model to capture the
bimodal behaviors. The reviews of a user in the order of posting
time form a chain. Hidden states of a user at each time-stamp can
be either active or inactive. Users in active/inactive state post re-
views in fast/slow rate respectively. We further extend it to a La-
beled Hidden Markov Model so as to estimate the likelihood of
each user being a spammer.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our model by applying it to
a large real-life dataset from Dianping.com. Our contributions in
this paper are as follows:
1. We discovered the disparate bimodal distributions of review
spammers and non-spammers. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first such discovery. Labeled Hidden Markov Model
(LHMM) is proposed to detect spammers by modeling their tem-
poral posting behaviors. Note that our work is not to reverse-
engineer Dianping’s filter which consists of over 100 algorithms
with numerous manually designed rules using a large number of
signals. Our principled approach requires only the time-stamps
of reviews, and it is easily applicable to many other social media
platforms. In return, our discovery and algorithm can improve
commercial filters too.
2. This work is the first to discover the disparities between ac-
tive/inactive states transitions between spammers and non-spammers.
Such behaviors are encoded in Labeled HMM to help infer users’
class labels.
3. Compared with other available academic datasets which were
crawled from review host sites, our dataset is shared by Dian-
ping.com directly with their commercial filter’s output. Due to
its large size and accurate labels, for the first time, we are able
to compare the proposed model with state-of-art methods in large
scale.
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4. Besides detecting individual spammers, the model’s hidden
states can also be used to find spammer groups who work together
on spam campaign. A co-bursting network to measure the collu-
sion of reviewers is proposed. Comparison of clustering results
indicates that our network is more effective in detecting spammer
groups than the review-product network used in the existing work
[24, 34].
2. RELATED WORK
2.1 Academic Datasets
Jindal and Liu [13] released the first opinion spam dataset1 crawled
from Amazon in 2008. However, they simply treated duplicate and
near-duplicate Amazon product reviews as fake reviews. There cer-
tainly exist fake reviews that are not identical or similar to any other
reviews. Ott et al. [26] used Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT)
to crowdsource anonymous online workers to write fake hotel re-
views. The review dataset2 that they compiled had only 1,600 re-
views which are too small to support reliable statistical analysis.
Furthermore, the motivations and the psychological states of mind
of hired Turkers and the professional spammers in the real world
are quite different. As pointed out in [25], these crowdsourced re-
views are not similar to real-life fake ones in review hosting sites
and they also do not have reviewer behavior information.
Mukherjee and other researchers [17, 25] reported the analysis of
commercial filter based on reviews of a small number of hotels and
restaurants in Chicago that they crawled3. In the product/business
page of yelp, on the top there are a list of recommended reviews
which are considered as authentic but at the bottom there is a link
to a list of reviews that are currently not recommended. Mukher-
jee et al. assume those down-weighted reviews are fake. There
are two problems with this approach: First, low quality reviews or
short reviews are generally hidden by Yelp but they do not nec-
essarily represent the fake reviews. Secondly, Yelp has an anti-
scraping technique which prevents them from scraping all reviews
of the hotels. Due to the difficulty of crawling and Yelp’s rate
limit, they only obtained a small set of (about 66,000) reviews.
Those above-mentioned academic review datasets all suffer from
two critical problems, i.e. (a) they under-represent the reviews of
hotels/restaurants or users as they did not scape all the reviews for
each hotel/restaurant nor each reviewer (see section 5); (b) they rely
on pseudo labels which are inferred by the authors’ intuition rather
then the true output from commercial filters or ground truth. The
review datasets in our work is shared by Dianping. Not only it is
large and representative, but also each review is tagged with their
commercial filters in production. For the first time, we are able
to study the essence of opinion spam and compare our proposed
approach with existing works.
2.2 Bursty Reviews
Bursty reviews have been studied recently by several researchers.
Fei et al. [6] studied the review time-series for individual products.
They assume reviewers in a review burst of a product are typically
related in the sense that spammers tend to work with other spam-
mers and genuine reviewers with other genuine reviewers. They
thus applied Loopy Belief Propagation to rank spammers using
heuristic propagation parameters. Similarly, Xie et al. [33] ana-
lyzed multiple time-series of a single retailer including daily num-
ber of reviews, average rating, and ratio of singleton reviews. Their
1http://liu.cs.uic.edu/download/data/
2http://myleott.com/op_spam/
3http://liu.cs.uic.edu/download/yelp_filter/
end task is to find the time intervals in which a spam attack happens
to a retailer. However our work focuses on studying individual re-
viewers’ reviews time-series and its goal is to identify individual
spammers and spammer groups. [30] explored temporal dynamics
of spam in Yelp such as buffered and reduced spamming rates but
does not model inter arrival times. Other researchers applied vari-
ous Bayesian approaches to detect anomalies in rating time-series
[9, 10, 12]. However, our model only requires the timing of each
review and the byproduct of our model can be used to detect spam-
mer groups effectively. Incorporating rating signals to our model
will be part of our future work.
2.3 Classification and Ranking
To detect review spam, Ott et al. [26] built supervised learn-
ing models using unigrams and bigrams and Mukherjee et al. [25]
added many behavioral features to improve it. Similarly related is
the task of psycholinguistic deception detection which detects lies
[23], computer-mediated deception in role-playing games [36] and
so on. Besides, with only a small portion of labeled reviews, re-
searchers pointed out that using Positive-Unlabeled Learning (or
PU learning) [11, 16, 18, 29] outperforms traditional supervised
learning. Since PU learning is not the focus of this work, we treat
filtered reviews as positive and unfiltered reviews as negative. In
the past few years, many researchers incorporated network rela-
tions into opinion spam detection. Most of them constructed a het-
erogeneous network of users/reviews and products. Some of them
employed HITS-like ranking algorithm [32], some applied Loopy
Belief Propagation [1, 6, 28] and others utilized collective classifi-
cation [16, 34]. In this work, we propose to build a network using
co-bursting relations and it is shown to be more effective in captur-
ing the intricate relations between spammers especially for raised
accounts. Our work can largely benefit these above works with
co-bursting.
2.4 Spammer Group Detection
The second task of our paper is to detect collusive spammers
who work in groups. Although recent progress has been made to
uncover such spam groups [4, 24, 34, 35], evaluation of spammer
groups was troublesome as the ground truth of large-scale dataset
was sadly unavailable. Thanks to the labels from Dianping’s sys-
tem, for the first time, evaluation on the clustering results of our
co-burst networking against co-reviewing network is made possi-
ble. In section 4, we will discuss effectiveness of our proposed
clustering framework for spammer group detection.
3. MODELING REVIEWERS’ ACTIVITIES
3.1 Motivation
One of the simplest models for user temporal activity modeling is
the Poisson Process which is a process where events occur contin-
uously and independently at a constant average rate. In probability
theory and statistics, the exponential distribution is used to describe
the length of time intervals between two events in a Poisson Pro-
cess. The Probability Density Function (PDF) of an exponential
distribution is as (1), where λ is the rate parameter. So one can see
that as λ gets larger, events in the process that we are waiting for to
happen tends to happen more quickly, hence the name of rate pa-
rameter. A very useful property of exponential distribution is that
the mean or expected value of an exponentially distributed random
variable X with rate parameter λ is exactly the reciprocal of λ (2).
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Figure 1: Bimodal distribution of inter-arrival time ∆i
f(x;λ) =
{
λe−λx x > 0
0 x < 0
(1)
E(X) =
1
λ
(2)
Let ti, i = 0, 1, . . . , T denote the time-stamps of a user’s re-
views over a time period of interest. The inter-review duration or
inter-arrival time between two adjacent reviews is denoted by ∆i
and by our assumption ∆i is drawn from an exponential distribu-
tion with rate parameter λ.
∆i , ti − ti−1 (3)
∆i ∼ Exp(λ) (4)
We aggregate all the inter-arrival times between users’ adjacent
reviews and plot the histogram in Figure 1 to see the distribution in
our data (the details of the data are given in the experiment section).
Interestingly, the distribution shows two distinct peaks at about 12
minutes and 24 days (we will explain it later in section 3.3). As
the Poisson distribution in this setting would typically model the
spread of reviews in the next time step around a fixed average, this
violates the bimodal distribution of inter-arrival time ∆i. We then
can argue that using homogeneous Poisson Process is insufficient.
To solve the problem, we follow the convention of [21] and propose
a two-mode HMM to model ∆i.
3.2 Two-mode Hidden Markov Model
A HMM is a model with a sequence of hidden states where one
has only observed signals emitted from the hidden states. In the
context of our problem, the hidden state Qi represents active or in-
active mode/state of reviewers and observed signals are the contin-
uous variables ∆i. ∆i between time-stamp ti−1 and ti may follow
different exponential distribution depending onQi. The binary cat-
egorization of modes is based on the bimodal distribution shown in
Figure 1. Reviews from active mode are written in a fast rate while
reviews in inactive mode are in a slow rate. Both rates are esti-
mated from users’ review posting time and they correspond to the
two modes/states. We now introduce the hidden states and proper-
ties of HMM.
Hidden States: We assume that a hidden state variable Qi takes
one of the two possible values {0, 1}. Qi = 0 denotes that the user
is in inactive mode between time-stamp ti−1 and ti while Qi = 1
denotes that the user is in active mode. Our defined model is a first-
order Markovian model which assumes Qi depends only on Qi−1
and is independent of previous hidden states Q1, Q2, . . . , Qi−2.
This approximation is proven reasonable in a great number of ap-
plications because it captures short-term memory of human behav-
iors. Specifically, in our problem, we find strong correlations be-
tween consecutive time intervals ∆i−1 and ∆i. Users in active
modes tend to be active and users in inactive modes are more likely
to stay inactive. The state transition probability matrix A is given
in (5) where akj = P (Qi = j|Qi−1 = k), k, j ∈ {0, 1}. The
initial state probability is a vector pi and pij = P (Q1 = j).
A = {akj} =
[
1− β0,1 β0,1
β1,0 1− β1,0
]
(5)
Observation Density: Since the state variable is unobserved, we
can only see the emitted time intervals between two consecutive
reviews. In the two-mode HMM, ∆i’s can be either sampled from
fast rate point process when Qi = 1 or slow rate point process
when Qi = 0. The two different modes correspond to exponential
distributions with rate parameters λ0 and λ1.
∆i ∼
{
Exp(λ0), Qi = 0
Exp(λ1), Qi = 1
(6)
We now use (6) for drawing ∆i with respect to Qi, for i ∈
[1, 2, . . . , T ]. The emission probability distribution is denoted by
B = {bj(∆)} and bj(∆) = f(∆;λj) = λje−λj∆ is the probabil-
ity of observing some ∆ at state j, where j ∈ {0, 1}.
Now we can formulate the joint probability of the observations
∆1:T and hidden states Q1:T as follows.
P (Q1:T ,∆1:T )
= P (Q1, Q2,∆2, . . . , QT ,∆T )
= P (Q1)
T∏
i=2
P (∆i|Qi)
T∏
i=2
P (Qi|Qi−1)
(7)
One of the three basic problems for HMM is called the decoding
problem which aims to estimate the most likely state sequence in
the model given the observations (8). Identifying the hidden states
helps to better understand spammers and their collusive behaviors.
Q∗1:T = argmax
Q1:T
P (Q1:T |∆1:T )
= argmax
Q1:T
P (Q1:T ,∆1:T )
(8)
A naive approach to examine all possible state assignments has
a running time O(T · 2T ) because there are totally 2T possibles
combinations and for each such combination it requires O(T ) to
calculate the product of probabilities. Fortunately, we can employ
an efficient dynamic programming algorithm named Viterbi [8] to
reduce the time complexity to O(T · 22) or simply O(T ). Let’s
define a vector
δi(j) = max
Q1:i−1
P (Q1:i−1, Qi = j,∆1:T ) (9)
to store the maximum joint probability along a single path fromQ1
to Qi−1 when current assignment is Qi = j. On initialization,
we set δ1(j) = pijbj(∆1) for j ∈ {0, 1}. Then we iteratively
calculate the δi(j) using (10) and finally the last state Q∗T of the
most likely state sequence is the one that maximizes (11). Starting
from the last state, the sequence of most likely state sequences can
be back-tracked through (12).
δi(j) = bj(∆i) max
k∈{0,1}
(
δi−1(k)akj
)
, 2 6 i 6 T, j ∈ {0, 1} (10)
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Figure 2: Heatmap of inter-arrival time (in seconds) for spammers and non-spammers. Each dot is a user represented by a pair of
his mean inter-arrival time in two states (µ0, µ1). x-axis is for µ0 in inactive state, y-axis for is µ1 in active state.
Q∗T = argmax
j∈{0,1}
δT (j) (11)
Q∗i−1 = argmax
j∈{0,1}
δi(j) ajQ∗i , 2 6 i 6 T (12)
Identifying the state sequence for each reviewer is useful in the
sense that reviews from active and inactive states have different im-
pact on calibrating spammers’ behaviors. We will show in section
4 that spammers tend to collaborate in active states.
3.3 Labeled Hidden Markov Model
Two-mode Hidden Markov Model is very useful for modeling
the temporal behavior of reviewers and can be used to predict the
timing of the next review. However, it has less predictive power
in measuring spammers. Given that our data has commercial level
spam labels produced by Dianping’s filter, we are able to analyze
and compare the dynamics of spammers and non-spammers. Sim-
ilar to Figure 1, we plot the histogram of aggregated inter-arrival
times between spam reviews and their previous reviews (red) as
well as between non-spam reviews and their previous reviews (blue)
in Figure 3. Note again that x-axis is in log scale. We make the fol-
lowing important observations:
• Bimodal distribution for both classes: Both spam reviews and
non-spam reviews show a bimodal distribution. The center of the
two humps are far apart from each other indicating distinct two-
mode states of review writing patterns. Note that we use the log
scale for x-axis. For spam reviews, active states may be the result
of aggressive spam activities from a group of spammers active in
collusion. For non-spam reviews, active states are likely to hap-
pen with events such as sales promotions or holiday celebrations.
• Distinct distributions for active and inactive modes: Since the
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Figure 3: Bimodal distribution of inter-arriving time for spam
and non-spam reviews (Note: x-axis is in log scale)
x-axis of the plot is in log-scale. We can see the histogram for
non-spam reviews has much longer tails than spam reviews. This
means that a lot of non-spam reviews are written in inactive mode.
Besides, there are much more spam reviews in active mode espe-
cially less than 100 seconds.
• Disparity of mean of time intervals: For both classes, we sim-
ply run Kmeans (k = 2) algorithm on the time intervals (log-
scale) and compute the mean of inter-arrival times. We find that
for both active and inactive states, the mean of time intervals of
non-spam reviews are about two to three times longer than that
of spam reviews showing a rather normal reviewing activity as
opposed to spam reviews that tend to be bursty [6].
Furthermore, we find great difference of user level posting pat-
terns in active and inactive states. We run two-mode HMM on
spammers and non-spammers in Dianping’s data separately. For
each spammer or non-spammer, we calculate the mean of the inter-
arrival time for active and inactive mode. Finally, we plot the heat-
map (Figure 2) for the two user classes using the pair of mean time
intervals. It is interesting to find that spammers and non-spammers
distribute very differently. Roughly for µ0 of inactive states be-
tween [104, 104.5], which reflects long activity pauses, µ1’s of non-
spammers are higher than those of spammers by an order of mag-
nitude showing a rather natural behavior of reviewing.
In addition to the disparity of the emission probability one can
see from above, we also find interestingly different transition pat-
terns between two states for both spammers and non-spammers.
For each of the two user classes, we aggregate the consecutive time
intervals between user’s reviews and visualize the distribution of
all pairs of previous time interval ∆i−1 and current time interval
∆i on the heatmap shown in Figure 5. In both sub figures, we can
easily see four regions that correspond to four types of transitions.
The lower left region means the transition that the active states at
ti−1 remain active at ti and likewise, the upper right corner are
those states remain inactive. The upper left region corresponds to
inactive states changed from active states while the lower right one
Y
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 QT
Δ1 Δ2 Δ3 Δ4 ΔT
Figure 4: Representation of Labeled Hidden Markov Model
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Figure 5: Heatmap of consecutive time interval pairs (in seconds). Each point corresponds to (∆i−1, ∆i) for some reviewer.
is the opposite. We find the following interesting observations:
• In the lower left corner of Figure 5(a), there is a strong posi-
tive correlation between ∆i−1 and ∆i for spammers when states
remain active while as the correlation between non-spammers in
Figure 5(b) is very weak. This may be because even though differ-
ent spammers exhibit different posting rates while in active state,
the posting rates for a single spammer will not change much. But
posting rates of an ordinal reviewer in active state at different
timestamps may vary. As a consequence, we can see the hot area
in the lower left forms a line along the diagonal for Figure 5(a)
but not for Figure 5(b).
• In Figure 5(a), when spammers’ states change from inactive
to active (lower right region), they are active “differently” and
when their states transit from active to inactive, they are inac-
tive “similarly” (upper left region). However, it is exactly the
opposite in Figure 5(b) for non-spammers, i.e., during transitions
between two different states ordinary reviewers are active “simi-
larly” but inactive “differently”. Such dramatic differences sug-
gest that spammers behave strangely at the moment of activation
and hibernation and their transitions are indeed abnormal.
• Referring to the upper right corner of Figure 5(a) and Figure(b),
we find that spammers “rest” in the similar rate concentrating in a
small region. However, while authentic users are resting, the time
intervals between reviews spread out the entire upper right corner.
Clearly patterns for non-spammers are more natural or organic.
Based on the discovery of the major differences between emis-
sion probability and transition probability of HMM that ran on two
classes of users, we propose a novel extension to the two-mode
HMM and call it the Labeled Hidden Markov Model (LHMM)
which incorporates the class label available in our dataset. The pa-
rameters of Labeled HMM are learned from the training data which
is then used for prediction on the testing data using the Baum-
Welch method [27]. Based on the original two-mode HMM model,
we introduce a new binary variable Y to represent the classes or
labels as shown in Figure 4. Y = + stands for spammers and −
for non-spammers. The variable Y plays a significant role in the
generating process of HMM. The transition probability matrix A
is extended to A+ and A− for spammers and non-spammers re-
spectively. The set of rate parameters < λ0, λ1 > now becomes
< λ+0 , λ
−
0 , λ
+
1 , λ
−
1 >. Consequently, the emission probability is
dependent on the user class Y (13).
∆i ∼
{
Exp(λY0 ), Qi = 0
Exp(λY1 ), Qi = 1
(13)
In order to predict the value of Y given the observations ∆1:T , we
need to use Bayesian theorem. The most probable value that the
class variable takes is the one that better explains or generates the
observations. Thus we have the following:
y∗ = argmax
y
P (Y = y|∆1:T )
= argmax
y
P (∆1:T |Y = y) · P (Y = y)
P (∆1:T )
(14)
The denominator P (∆1:T ) in (14) is a constant term regardless of
y, so we can simply drop it. The prior probability of the class vari-
able P (Y ) can be easily computed by counting. The difficult part
is the conditional probability P (∆1:T |Y ). Recall that equation (7)
is the joint probability of observations and hidden states, the con-
ditional probability can be calculated by marginalizing the hidden
states:
P (∆1:T |Y )
=
∑
Q1:T
P (Q1:T ,∆1:T |Y )
=
∑
Q1:T
P (Q1|Y )
T∏
i=2
P (∆i|Qi, Y )
T∏
i=2
P (Qi|Qi−1, Y )
(15)
By its direct definition, the time complexity is O(T · 2T ). Fortu-
nately, another dynamic programming algorithm named Forward-
backward method [3, 27] can largely reduce it to linear time. Sim-
ilar to Viterbi, the Forward-backward method caches intermediate
results facilitating the computation.
We define a variable αi(j|y) = P (∆1:i, Qi = j|Y ) to store
the joint probability of observations and Qi = j with all previous
states Q1:i−1 marginalized given Y . To do so, we first initialize
α1(j|y) = piyj · bj(∆1|y) , j ∈ {0, 1} and then iteratively solve
αi(j|y), for i = 2, . . . , T .
αi(j|y) = bj(∆i|y)
∑
k∈{0,1}
αi−1(k) akj . (16)
After that, we can get P (∆1:T |Y ) = ∑j αT (j|y) easily.
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Figure 6: Examples of co-bursting behaviors
4. DETECTING SPAMMER GROUPS
In this section, we discuss how hidden states estimated from our
model can be used to detect spammer groups. Group spamming
refers to a group of reviewers writing fake reviews together to pro-
mote or to demote some target products. A spam group or a spam
community is more damaging than a single individual spammer as
members of a group can launch a spam attack together in a stealth
mode, and due to multiple members, a group can take total control
of the sentiment on a product. Each individual reviewer may not
look suspicious, but a bigger picture of all of them sheds light on
the collusive behaviors of a spam community. Thus, identifying
such groups is very important.
Previous studies on spammer groups in [24, 34] proposed to use
Frequent Itemset Mining (FIM). They treat reviewers as items and
the businesses/products as transactions. Their idea is to extract
groups of reviewers who have reviewed multiple products together.
But it suffers from a couple of drawbacks.
• Computationally expensive: The problem is equivalent to find-
ing all complete bi-partite subgraphs in the reviewer-product net-
work, which is NP-hard. High support threshold in FIM will find
only a few extreme cases (low recall), while low support causes
combinatorial explosion especially in large datasets where there
are millions of reviewers and thousands or more of products.
• Failure to capture loosely connected subgraphs: Itemsets in
FIM correspond to a complete subgraph. But it is not necessar-
ily true that every spammer should connect to all the products
reviewed by other members in the same group.
• Co-reviewing doesn’t mean co-spamming: There is a large chance
that genuine reviewers may happen to co-review many popular
products/business. Besides, nowadays recommendation systems
are also suggesting consumers to buy similar products. The as-
sumption that co-reviewing leads to co-spamming is too strong.
In our dataset, we find an interesting phenomenon that when a
restaurant has bursty reviews arriving at some point, many spam-
mers are likely to be actively writing reviews to it as well as many
other restaurants. We call it co-bursting (i.e., a pair of users who
have bursty reviews, some of which are posted to the same restau-
rant in a short period of time) as opposed to co-reviewing.
Figure 6 gives an example of six spammers’ daily number of re-
views. At about day 480 (since 2012/01/01), all the six users’ were
actively writing reviews, but they were mostly inactive at any other
time periods. In addition to the temporal coincidence, we found
that at least one of the reviews for each user were written for the
Algorithm 1 An efficient algorithm to construct the co-bursting
network
Input: a set of reviews R, a set of users U , a set of restaurants S, time
window ω
Output: the co-bursting matrix F
1: for each u ∈ U do
2: Ru = |r ∈ R : r.user = u|
3: Run HMM on Ru to get the estimated state of each of his reviews
stored as r.state
4: end for
5: for each s ∈ S do
6: Rs = |r ∈ R : r.restaurant = s|
7: Build a B+ tree T s for Rs indexing on the posting time of reviews.
8: end for
9: Create a hashtable H to store the number of times of co-bursting for a
pair of users
10: for each u ∈ U do
11: for each r ∈ Ru do
12: s = r.restaurant
13: query B+ Tree T s to get reviews for restaurant s posted between
< r.t− ω, r.t + ω > which are denoted as C.
14: for each review c ∈ C do
15: if r.state = c.state = 1 then
16: i = r.user, j = c.user
17: Hi,j = Hi,j + 1
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
21: end for
22: Convert H to sparse matrix F and output F
same restaurant. Such phenomena is prevalent in our dataset show-
ing that co-bursting is a good indicator of group spamming. Since
our Hidden Markov Model gives a good estimation of hidden states
for all the reviews, we thus propose to construct a co-bursting net-
work based on the active-state of reviews. The co-burst network
is more representative of the collective spamming behaviors and is
thus more effective in capturing relationships between spammers
than the review-product network, which were used to detect spam-
mer groups in [24, 34]. Because it is much cleaner than reviewer-
product network and the chance of random correlations is much
lower. Thus it is very useful to measure the degree of collaboration
between spammers.
We denote the co-bursting network as F = {Fuv}n×n, where n
is the total number of users and Fuv represents the number of times
reviewer u and reviewer v co-burst within a time window ω to some
restaurant (rest). In our setting, we choose ω = 3 days. ri.state
means the hidden state of review i and ri.t is the time when it is
posted.
Fuv =
∣∣∣(ri, rj) : ri ∈ Ru, rj ∈ Rv , ri.rest = rj .rest,
|ri.t− rj .t| < ω, ri.state = rj .state = 1
∣∣∣ (17)
A naive approach to construct the co-bursting network using equa-
tion 17 is very inefficient. Thus, in Algorithm 1 we propose to use
a B+ tree and a hashtable to facilitate the computation. We first
group reviews by its reviewer/user and run our proposed HMM
model to get the estimate states for all reviews (Line 1-4) and then
we build B+ tree for each restaurant to support range queries on
the timestamps (Line 5-8). We maintain a hashtable to store the
number of times a pair of users co-burst which is calculated effi-
ciently from Line 10-21. The overall run-time for the last querying
step is O(m × log(p)) where m is the total number of reviews
in the dataset and p is the average number of reviews written to a
restaurant. Because log(p) is a small constant, our proposed al-
gorithm is linear to the size of reviews, therefore it is scalable to
Table 1: Comparison of publicly available academic datasets and the Dianping dataset
Dataset Reviews Business Reviews per business Users Reviews per user Users(reviews>=10) Temporal Info Label
AMT [26] 1,600 20 80.00 N/A N/A N/A 8 crowdsourced
Yelp [25] 66,836 130 514.13 34,975 1.92 690 3 pseudo label
Dianping 2,762,249 4374 631.52 633,381 4.36 67,698 3 commercial label
large datasets for any commercial review websites. Once the co-
bursting networok is constructed, graph clustering can be used to
find clusters, which are spammer groups (see the next section).
5. EXPERIMENTS
We now evaluate our model and compare it with baselines. Our
dataset from dianping.com consists of restaurant reviews from the
most popular restaurants in Shanghai, China between 2011/11/01
and 2014/04/18. As we mentioned earlier, the data has fake and
non-fake labels produced by Dianping’s filtering system. The la-
bels can be trusted because Dianping has a feedback system allow-
ing reviewers to complain. If they complain that their “genuine”
reviews are removed, Dianping would send them the evidences for
removing their reviews. Dianping’s record shows that complaints
are also quite rare. And their CTO claimed that they have used over
100 algorithms and the accuracy of their system is about 95%4.
Dianping also has an expert group that constantly evaluates their
system’s performance.
Recall in section 2.1, many other researchers have compiled re-
view datasets for opinion spam detection. We now list the statistics
of all the available academic datasets that contain spam/non-spam
labels in Table 1. However, due to various reasons, they are not
suitable for our experiments because we focus on modeling users’
temporal patterns. The Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) dataset
is very small and contains neither users’ information nor the time
when reviews were posted. Even though the yelp dataset is larger,
the number of reviews per user is very small because the author
of this dataset only scraped 130 businesses (more precisely, restau-
rants) in Chicago. Besides their scraping was done per business
rather than per reviewer. So in their dataset, reviews of a single
reviewer do not represent the his overall behaviors because many
of his reviews pertaining to other businesses are not in the dataset.
There are only 690 users who wrote more than 10 reviews in the
Yelp dataset. Thus, we are only able to evaluate our experiments
on Dianping’s dataset.
5.1 Performance of Labeled HMM
In our experiment, reviews are grouped by reviewers or users
and sorted in the order they are posted. The parameters of Labeled
HMM are learned from training data which is then used for predic-
tion on the testing data to detect fake reviewers. We first compare
our Labeled Hidden Markov Model (LHMM) with existing super-
vised learning methods. Although there are many recent progress
on review spam, due to the lack of ground truth, most of the studies
are semi-supervised or unsupervised grounded on the authors’ intu-
itions [6, 32, 33, 35]. Since our approach is supervised learning, it
is fair to compare with supervised learning models as listed below.
1. SVM(ngram) [26]: Ott et al. built a Support Vector Machines
classifier using text features including unigrams and bigrams.
2. SVM(BF) [25]: Mukherjee et al. proposed many behavioral
features including the number of reviews per day, rating deviation
and content similarity. They showed that combining users’ be-
haviors with linguistic features can achieve better performance.
4http://weibo.com/2235685314/BaoyXqlgt?type=comment
3. SVM(ngram+BF) [25]: Mukherjee et al. also combined be-
havioral features with ngram features improving the results.
4. PU-LEA [11]: The first Positive-Unlabeled (PU) Learning
model applied in review spam detection is PU-LEA. PU learning
usually outperforms traditional supervised learning when there
are hidden positive instances inside negative data.
5. LHMM (UT): We would like to show how important the tran-
sitional probability of Labeled HMM (LHMM) is, so we use the
uniform transition (UT) probability in LHMM rather than learn-
ing from data.
The effectiveness of all models are evaluated using the standard
Accuracy, Precision, Recall and F1-score using five-fold cross val-
idation. We can observe that although the proposed Labeled HMM
(LHMM) model requires only the time-stamps of users’ reviews, it
markedly outperforms the baselines in review spammers detection
as shown in Figure 7. It is worth noting that the largest gain of our
model is recall. Because some spam accounts may exhibit mixed
behaviors which confuse classifiers based on language and behav-
ior features, whereas our proposed Labeled HMM can successfully
model such temporal dynamics and therefore is most effective es-
pecially with the highest recall. Compared with LHMM(UT) which
uses uniform transition probability, LHMM can achieve better re-
sults as it learns the transition probability from the data and well
captures the transitional behaviors as shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 7: Model performance in Accuracy(A), Precision(P),
Recall(R) and F1-score(F) (Positive class is spammer).
Based on Dianping’s information, raised accounts are a popu-
lar means of spamming. Since they are raised carefully and ac-
cumulate good credits over a period of time, businesses need to
pay four times more to get fake reviews from such high reputa-
tion accounts than regular fake ones in the underground market5.
According to Dianping’s commercial filters’ output, over 40% of
the spammers in our dataset fall into this category. Figure 8 ex-
emplifies the daily reviews counts of three raised accounts detected
by our model. Clearly, there are two distinct phases: one is the
farming phase when the account behaves normally and randomly
writes reviews to accumulate credits; the other phase is the harvest
phase when the raised account aggressively posts spam reviews to
5http://finance.sina.com.cn/consume/puguangtai/20120904/
061913036552.shtml
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Figure 8: Number of daily reviews of three raised accounts
get paid. We further investigated the effectiveness of our model in
detecting raised accounts. Our proposed method successfully de-
tected 85.41% of all the raised accounts of Dianping’s dataset.
5.2 Performance of Co-burst Clustering
The ground truth of spammers’ group affiliation is very hard, if
not impossible, to know. We assume that spammers in the same
cluster is a spammer group. Our goal is to validate that the co-
burst graph is more intuitive and helpful in quantifying user col-
laborations than co-reviewing which is more noisy. We build two
types of graphs: co-reviewing graph using reviewer-product rela-
tions [24, 32, 34] and co-burst graph using users’ hidden states ac-
cording to our definition in (17). Then we apply three efficient
clustering algorithms that are suitable for the scale of our dataset
(using all the data): Louvain Method [5], Kmeans and a hierarchi-
cal clustering algorithm from recent work [35].
Table 2: Evaluation of models’ performances
Network Method Purity Entropy
Co-reviewing Louvain 0.69 0.87
Co-reviewing Kmeans 0.72 0.81
Co-reviewing Hierarchical 0.72 0.82
Co-burst Louvain 0.83 0.67
Co-burst Kmeans 0.86 0.73
Co-burst Hierarchical 0.88 0.76
Numbers in bold indicate better performance
We use two important metrics to evaluate the clustering results:
Purity and Entropy, which are widely used measures of cluster
quality based on ground truth labels [2]. Purity [22] is a metric
in which each cluster is assigned to the class with the majority vote
in it and the accuracy of this assignment is the number of correctly
assigned instances divided by the total number of instances N .
purity(C, Y ) =
1
N
∑
k
maxj |yj ∩ ck| (18)
whereC = {c1, . . . , ck} is the set of cluster ids and Y = {y1, . . . , yj}
is the set of users’ real class labels. ck is interpreted as the set of
reviewers in cluster k and yj is the set of reviewers whose label is
j. The higher purity score means a purer cluster. Entropy [31] on
the other hand measures the uniformity of a cluster. The entropy of
all clusters is defined as weighted sum of entropy of each cluster:
entropy = −
∑
k
nk
N
∑
j
P (j, k) log2 P (j, k) (19)
where P (j, k) is the probability of finding a reviewer of class
j in cluster k. The quality of a cluster improves as the entropy
decreases. In Table 2, we list the purity and entropy of the cluster-
ing results. For each clustering algorithm, clusters computed from
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Figure 9: Strong positive correlation between daily fake re-
views of two restaurants that are only 100 meters apart
co-burst graph are significantly better than that from co-reviewing
graph. Such finding is consistent with our intuition and explains
the essence of spammers’ collaboration.
5.3 Co-bursting of Restaurants Reviews
The collective spamming behaviors from spammers result in a
similar view from the perspective of restaurants. Since there are
many spammers actively writing reviews to a set of restaurants to
promote their businesses, it is very likely to see those restaurants’
time-series of daily (fake) reviews to co-burst as well. Figure 9
shows an example, which has two restaurants that are only within
100 meters. We found that there is a very strong positive correla-
tion between their numbers of daily reviews (applied with 14-day
moving average) and we notice that especially in the bursty regions,
their correlation is the highest which indicates the co-bursting be-
haviors of restaurants. We further investigated whether they are
indeed promoted by some spammer community or at least whether
they were promoted by the same set of common spammers. There
are overall 3196 reviewers for restaurant A and 8686 reviewers for
restaurant B and interestingly they share 1166 reviewers. From
April, 2013 to May, 2013 which corresponds to the highest spike
of the two time-series, we found 311 reviewers wrote fake reviews
to restaurant A and 591 reviewers to restaurant B and among those
reviewers 139 reviewers wrote fake reviews to both restaurants.
Spammer groups often proactively look for business owners to con-
vince them to use their services. It is not surprising to see that they
can help both restaurants who are competitors in the same business
zone because it is easy to convince a business owner if his rival is
already working with them. This explains the high correlation be-
tween their bursty regions. In summary, such views from the per-
spective of restaurants’ bursts provide a different angle to show the
intense collusion among spammer communities and explains why
our model can detect hard case scenarios where traditional linguis-
tic and behavioral features may not work.
6. CONCLUSION
In this work, we first conducted a series of analyses using Dian-
ping’s real-life dataset with spam labels. The analyses showed ma-
jor differences of temporal patterns of spammers and non-spammers.
The mean of time intervals between consecutive reviews for spam-
mers is much smaller than that of authentic reviewers. Besides,
during state transition, spammers are differently active but similarly
inactive but non-spammers are exactly the opposite. We then pro-
posed a variant of HMM named Labeled HMM to model reviewers’
posting activities and to detect opinion spammers. Furthermore,
we found many spammers happen to actively write fake reviews to
same restaurants together in short period of time. We define a co-
bursting network based on co-bursting behaviors from spammers
and non-spammers. Hidden states estimated from our model are
also good clues for discovering collusive spammers whose collec-
tive behaviors are well captured by co-bursting. Most importantly,
since our model only leverages the time stamps of reviews, it is
generally applicable to all the other review sites.
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